We show that the security of some well-known cryptographic protocols, primitives and assumptions (e.g., the Schnorr identification scheme, commitments secure under adaptive selectivedecommitment, the "one-more" discrete logarithm assumption) cannot be based on any standard assumption using a Turing (i.e., black-box) reduction. These results follow from a general result showing that Turing reductions cannot be used to prove security of constant-round sequentially witness-hiding special-sound protocols for unique witness relations, based on standard assumptions; we emphasize that this result holds even if the protocol makes non-black-box use of the underlying assumption.
INTRODUCTION
Modern Cryptography relies on the principle that cryptographic schemes are proven secure based on mathematically precise assumptions; these can be general -such as the existence of one-way functions-or specific-such as the hardness of factoring products of large primes. The security proof is a reduction that transforms any attacker A of the * Pass is supported in part by an Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship, NSF CAREER Award CCF-0746990, AFOSR Award FA9550-08-1-0197, BSF Grant 2006317 and I3P grant 2006CS-001-0000001-02.
scheme into a machine that breaks the underlying assumption (e.g., inverts an alleged one-way function). This study has been extremely successful, and during the past four decades many cryptographic tasks have been put under rigorous treatment and numerous constructions realizing these tasks have been proposed under a number of well-studied complexity-theoretic intractability assumptions. But there are some well-known protocols, primitives, and assumptions, that have resisted security reductions under well-studied intractability assumptions.
The Schnorr identification scheme Schnorr's identification [Sch91] scheme is one of the most well-known and commonly-used identification schemes. For instance, recent usage includes the BlackBerry Router protocol. Schnorr showed security of this scheme under a passive (eavesdropper) attack based on the discrete logarithm assumption. But what about active (malicious) attacks? In particular, can security under active-even just sequential-attacks be based on the discrete logarithm assumption, or any other "standard" intractability assumption?
1 The adaptive selective decommitment problem Assume a polynomial-time adversary receives a number of commitments and may then adaptively request openings of, say, half of them. Do the unopened commitments still remain hiding? This problem was first formalized by Dwork, Naor, Reingold and Stockmeyer [DNRS03] but according to them it arouse over 25 years ago in the context of distributed computing.
2
As noted by Dwork et al, random-oracle-based commitment schemes easily satisfy this property. Can we construct non-interactive (or even two-round) commitment schemes that provably satisfy this property based on any standard intractability assumption?
As we shall discuss shortly, Bellare and Palacio [BP02] have demonstrated that Schnorr's scheme is secure under active attacks under a new type of "one-more inversion" assumption. 2 We remark that DNRS focused their treatment on a nonadaptive version of this game where the adversary must select all the commitments to be opened up in a single shot; the general adaptive version is considered in Remark 7.1 in [DNRS03] . 3 Interestingly, the related question of constructing encryption schemes secure under selective decryption based on "standard-type assumptions" has recently been solved [BHY09] .
One-more inversion assumptions Can a polynomialtime algorithm A, given a prime-order group G and a generator g for G, find the discrete logarithm (w.r.t to the generator g) to "target" points y1, . . . , y ∈ G if it may make − 1 queries to a discrete logarithm oracle (for the group G and generator g)? The "one-more" discrete-logarithm assumption states that no such algorithm exists. Assumptions of this "one-more inversion" type were introduced by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko [BNPS03] and have been used to prove the security of a number of practical schemes; for instance, Bellare and Palacio [BP02] have shown active security of Schnorr's identification scheme under the one-more discrete logarithm assumption. But can the security of these type of one-more inversion assumptions be based on more standard type assumptions?
Unique Blind Signatures In 1982, Chaum [Cha82] introduced the concept of a "blind signature"-roughly speaking, a signature scheme where a user may ask a signer S to sign a message m while keeping the content of m secret from S-and provided its first implementation. His scheme is non-interactive (just as traditional signature schemes) and has the desirable property that for every message there is a unique valid signature. Can the security of his scheme, or more generally, any "unique non-interactive blind signature" (i.e., non-interactive blind signature schemes with unique signatures), be based on standard assumptions?
Witness hiding of parallelized versions of classical zero-knowledge protocols It is well-known that parallelized versions of the classic three-round zeroknowledge protocols of [GMR89, GMW91, Blu86] are witness indistinguishable [FS90] . As shown by Feige and Shamir [FS90] , for certain languages with multiple witnesses, they are also witness hiding under sequential (and even concurrent) composition. Can we prove that these protocols also are witness hiding under sequential composition for languages with unique witnesses based on any standard assumption?
In this paper, we present negative answers to the above questions for a very liberal definition of "standard intractability assumptions", if we restrict to Turing (i.e., black-box) reductions-that is, reductions that use the alleged attacker A as a black-box. More precisely, following Naor [Nao03] (see also [DOP05, HH09, RV10]), we model an intractability assumption as an arbitrary game between a (potentially) unbounded challenger C, and an attacker A.
4 A is said to break the assumption C with respect to the threshold t if it can make C output 1 with probability non-negligibly higher than the threshold t. The only restriction we put on C is that it communicates with A in an a priori fixed polynomial number of rounds; we refer to such assumptions as polynomial-round intractability assumptions. All traditional cryptographic hardness assumptions (e.g., the hardness of factoring, the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem etc.) can be modeled as 2-round challengers C with the threshold t being either 0 (in case of the factoring or discrete logarithm problems) or 1/2 (in case of the decisional Deffie-Hellman problem). But also the "one-more discrete logarithm assumption" for a fixed polynomial l, or the assumption that a specific protocol (P, V ) is witness-hiding under a single, or even an a priori bounded number of, interactions can be modeled as polynomial-round challengers C (with the threshold t = 0).
Our Results
Our main result shows that it is impossible to (Turing) reduce any polynomial-round intractability assumption to the witness hiding under sequential composition property of certain types of constant-round arguments of knowledge protocols-called "computationally special-sound" protocolsfor languages with unique witnesses. All our specific lowerbounds follow as corollaries of this result.
Recall that a three-round public-coin interactive proof is said to be special-sound [CDS94] , if a valid witness to the statement x can be efficiently computed from any two accepting proof-transcripts of x which have the same first message but different second messages. We consider a relaxation of this notion-which we simply call computational special-soundness-where a) the number of communication rounds is any constant (instead of just three), b) the extractor may need a polynomial number of accepting transcripts (instead of just two), and c) extraction need only succeed if the transcripts are generated by communicating with a computationally-bounded prover. All traditional constantround public-coin proofs of knowledge protocols (such as [GMR89, GMW91, Blu86, Sch91] , as well as instantiations of [GMW91, Blu86] using statistically-hiding commitments) satisfy this property, and continue to do so also under parallel repetition.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem -Informal). Let (P, V ) be a constant-round computationally special-sound interactive argument with super logarithmic-length verifier messages for the language L with unique witnesses. Assume there exists a polynomial-time Turing reduction R such that R A breaks the r(·)-round assumption C (where r is a polynomial) w.r.t. the threshold t for every A that breaks sequential witness hiding of (P, V ). Then C with respect to the threshold t can be broken in polynomial-time.
Our main theorem is most closely related to the work of Haitner, Rosen and Shaltiel [HRS09] . As we explain in more detail in Section 1.2, [HRS09] also present lower bounds for using Turing reductions to demonstrate witnes hiding for constant-round public-coin protocols. They consider a more general class of protocols than we do, and they present a lower-bound for "stand-alone" (as opposed to sequential) witness hiding. However, their lower bound only applies to restricted classes of Turing reduction, whereas our lower bound applies to arbitrary Turing reductions.
Our main theorem directly rules out using Turing reductions for demonstrating sequential witness hiding of parallelized versions of classical zero-knowledge protocols for languages with unique witnesses based on polynomial-round intractability assumptions.
We next show that all the previously mentioned questions can be restated in the language of "sequential witness hiding for unique witness languages", and we can thus use our main theorem to provide negative answers also to those questions.
Schnorr's identification scheme: To rule out Turing reductions for proving security of the Schnorr identification scheme, note that Schnorr's protocol is a specialsound proof for a unique witness language. Next, if Schnorr's protocol is not sequentially witness hiding, then it cannot be a secure identification scheme: The witness in this proof is the identifier's secret-key, so if an attacker can recover it after hearing polynomially many proofs, we can trivially violate the security of the identification scheme. (We mention that, on the other hand, the related scheme by Okamoto's scheme [Oka92] , can be proven secure based on the discrete logarithm assumption. However, the language considered in Okamoto's protocol does not have a unique witnesses.)
Adaptive selective decommitment: To rule out solutions to the selective-decommitment problem, we extend one of the results from [DNRS03] to show that if implementing the commitment scheme in GMW's Graph 3-Coloring protocol with non-interactive (or two-round) commitments that are secure under adaptive selective decommitment, then the resulting protocol is sequentially witness hiding for any efficiently samplable hard language with unique witnesses; 5 so assuming the existence of an efficiently samplable hard language with unique witnesses, Turing reductions cannot be employed to reduce adaptive selective-decommitment security of such commitments to any polynomial-round intractability assumption.
One more inversion assumptions: As mentioned, Bellare and Palacio [BP02] have shown that the security of the Schnorr scheme can be based on the "onemore discrete log" assumption, so by their work, we directly get that polynomial-round intractability assumptions cannot be Turing-reduced to the one-more discrete log assumption. By directly constructing appropriate special-sound protocols, we can generalize this result to rule out even weaker types of "manymore" discrete logarithm assumptions (where we require that it is hard to find inverses when having access to only inverses, where > 0.) Using the same approach, we get that polynomial-round intractability assumptions cannot be Turing reduced to many-more variants of the RSA problem either (and more generally, any family of certified permutations that is additive homomorphic).
Unique blind signatures: The notion of unforgeability for blind signature schemes [PS00] requires that no attacker having requested signatures (where is an arbitrary polynomial) can come up with + 1 signatures. We show that the existence of a unique non-interactive blind signatures implies that for every polynomial , there exists a computationally special-sound protocol for a unique witness language that is witness hiding under sequential repetitions; this suffices for applying 5 Dwork, Naor, Reingold and Stockmeyer [DNRS03] show that the GMW protocol instantiated with "plain" (i.e., nonadaptive) selective-decommitment secure commitment satisfies some weak notions of zero-knowledge which, in particular, imply single-instance witness-hiding for unique witness relations.
our main theorem to rule out using Turing reductions for basing the security of such blind signature schemes on polynomial-round intractability assumptions.
On the soundness of the Random Oracle and Generic Group models As mentioned, in the Random Oracle model [BR93] , commitments secure against adaptive-selective decommitments are easy to construct (see [DNRS03] ); thus, by our results, this yields (yet another, see e.g., [CGH04, GK03] example of a Random Oracle based scheme that cannot be provably instantiated using a concrete function, if we restrict to Turing reductions from polynomial-round intractability assumptions. The results of [CGH04, GK03] are stronger in the sense that any instantiation of their scheme with a concrete function can actually be broken. In contrast, we just show that the instantiated scheme cannot be proven secure using a Turing reduction based on a polynomial-round intractability assumption. On the other hand, the separations of [CGH04, GK03] consider artifical protocols, whereas the protocol we consider arguably is natural. In this respect our separation is similar to that of [DOP05] (which also considers a natural protocol, and rules out proofs of security), but is stronger as [DOP05] only rules out "generic" Turing reductions (see [DOP05] for more details) whereas we rule out arbitrary Turing reductions.
We also mention that Shoup [Sho97] has proven that Schnorr's identification scheme is secure in the generic group model; thus, our results yield a natural example where security proofs in the generic group model cannot be extended to security reductions based on any polynomial-round intractability assumption. (As far as we know, such separations had previously only been established for "artificial" protocols.)
Other Related Work
Fully black-box separations The seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR88] provides a framework for proving black-box separations between cryptographic primitives. We highlight that this framework considers so-called "fullyblack-box constructions" (see [RTV04] for a taxonomy of various black-box separations); that is, the framework considers black-box constructions (i.e., the higher-level primitive only uses the underlying primitive as a black-box), and black-box reductions. (In contrast, we consider also nonblack-box constructions.) In this regime, Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek [BHY09] present limitations of (weak notions of) fully-black-box commitment schemes secure against selective decommitment, and Haitner, Rosen and Shaltiel [HRS09] show that certain strong types of fully-black-box constructions of constant-round public-coin proofs of knowledge cannot be witness hiding. Lower-bounds for general black-box reductions Turning to lower-bounds also for non-black box constructions, the seminal work of Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96] shows that no constant-round public-coin protocols with negligible soundness error can be black-box zero-knowledge; (blackbox) zero-knowledge is a significantly stronger property than sequential witness hiding, but as we shall see some of the techniques from this work will be useful for our lower bounds.
Following the works of Brassard [Bra83] and Akavia et al [AGGM06] , demonstrating limitations of "NP-hard Cryptography", in [Pas06] , we relate the question of demonstrating witness hiding of constant-round public-coin proofs for N P using black-box reductions and the question of whether one-way functions can be based on N P-hardness (again using black-box reductions); as shown in [PTV10] , this result can be interpreted as a conditional lower bound (under a new assumption) on the possibility of using black-box reductions to demonstrate a notion of witness hiding for constant-round public-coin proofs for N P based on one-way functions. We also mention the very recent concurrent work of Gentry and Wichs [GW11] which provides conditional lower bounds (assuming the existence of strong pseudorandom functions) on the possibility of using black-box reductions to prove soundness of "succint non-interactive arguments" based on socalled "falsifiable assumptions" [Nao03] . As far as we know, these are the only lower-bounds that consider non-black-box constructions and general (i.e., unrestricted) Turing reductions.
Lower-bounds for restricted black-box reductions To obtain stronger lower-bounds for non-black-box constructions, following the works of Feigenbaum and Fortnow [FF93] and Bogdanov and Trevisan [BT03] on the power of random self-reducible and non-adaptive reductions, several recent works prove limitations of restricted types of reductions for the above-mentioned problems. In this regime, Bresson, Monnerat and Vergnaud [BMV08] present limitations for basing the one-more discrete logarithm assumption on certain specific assumptions and using some restricted types of Turing reductions; Haitner, Rosen and Shaltiel [HRS09] rule out certain restricted types of reductions for demonstrating witness hiding of constant-round public-coin proof of knowledge protocols; Fischlin and Schroeder [FS10] provide lowerbounds for certain types of non-interactive blind signature schemes based on "non-interactive hardness assumptions" using certain restricted reductions. The above three work all rely on the so-called "meta-reduction" paradigm by Boneh and Venkatesan [BV98] ; we will also rely on this method. As we shall shortly explain, in the above three works, the reasons for considering restricted reductions (and restricted assumptions) are the same; the main technical contribution of this work is circumventing these problems.
Proof Techniques
To prove our main theorem, assume there exists a Turing reduction R such that R A breaks the assumption C whenever A breaks sequential witness hiding of a computationally special-sound argument (P, V ) for a language with unique witnesses. We want to use R to directly break C without the help of A. So, just as in [BMV08, HRS09, FS10] (following the paradigm of [BV98] ), the goal will be to efficiently emulate A for R (i.e., we will construct a "meta-reduction" which uses the underlying reduction R to break C). We will consider a particular oracle A that after hearing an appropriate number of proofs using (P, V ) (acting as a verifier) simply outputs a witness to the statement proved. As in the above-mentioned earlier works, the idea is to "extract" out the witness that A is supposed to provide R by "rewinding" R-after all, since (P, V ) is computationally specialsound, R, intuitively, must know a witness for all statements x that it gives proofs of to A. The problem with formalizing this intuition is that the reduction R is not a "stand-alone" prover-it might rewind and reset the oracle A, so it is no longer clear that it needs to "know" a witness for x in order to convince A of x. To get around this problem, [BMV08, HRS09, FS10] considered restricted reductions which ensure that R only queries A in a "nice" way, facilitating the extraction.
7 When considering general reductions, we run into the following three problems.
1. If R "nests" its oracle calls, then a naive extraction might result in an exponential running-time; the problem is analogous to that of performing simulation in the context of Concurrent Zero-knowledge [DNS04] .
2. When considering general assumptions C, we need to be careful not to "disturb" the outside interaction with C.
3. Finally, we need to ensure that even if we manage to appropriately rewind R, the witness we extract out actually is a valid witness.
To deal with the first two problems, we leverage the fact that we consider witness hiding under sequential composition (as opposed to single-instance witness hiding as in [HRS09] ). This means that we only need to provide R with a witness for a statement x after it has provided sufficiently many proofs of x; now, we can use ideas from positive results on concurrent zero-knowledge, and, in particular, simulation techniques inspired by those of Richardson and Kilian [RK99] (and their refinements in [PV08, DGS09, CLP10]) to ensure that we can rewind R without "blowing-up" the runtime, and while ensuring that we do not disturb the outside execution with C. We mention that we cannot use these techniques in a "black-box" fashion. For instance, we do not know how to adapt the simulation technique of KilianPetrank [KP01] to work in our setting. There are two reasons for this: 1) The reduction R might be rewinding its oracle, so we actually need a "resettable zero-knowledge" simulation [CGGM00] . 2) In contrast to the setting of concurrent and resettable zero-knowledge, we cannot design the protocol to be analyzed-rather the only thing we know is that the protocol consists of sufficiently many repetitions of a computationally special-sound protocol. Handling these issues requires a somewhat different analysis.
To deal with the third problem, we leverage the fact that we consider computationally special-sound protocols (as opposed to general proofs of knowledge, as in [HRS09] ). We show (relying on ideas from [GK96, Pas06] ) that such protocols intuitively satisfy a notion of "resettably-sound" [BGGL01] proofs of knowledge (when appropriately generating the verifier messages)-that is, they remain proofs of knowledge even under resetting attacks.
On the role of unique witnesses. Let us point out exactly where in the proof the unique witness requirement is used. Recall that we are rewinding R to extract out a witness so that we can emulate the oracle A for R. If the statement x has a unique witness w, we can ensure that the extracted witness will be identical to the witness that the oracle A would have returned. When dealing with statements with multiple witnesses, this might no longer be the case-in particular, although the rewinding procedure will succeed in extracting some witnesses, the distribution of the extracted witnesses might be different than the distribution of witnesses actually provided by A; thus, we can no longer guarantee that R succeeds in breaking the assumption C. This is not just an artifact of the proof: As mentioned, for languages with multiple witnesses, constant-round, sequentially witness-hiding special-sound proofs are known [FS90] . 
On Non-black-box Reductions
In this work we consider only Turing (i.e., black-box) reductions. As demonstrated by Barak's beautiful work [Bar01] , non-black-box reductions can be used to analyze some zero-knowledge arguments. In fact, a variant of the protocol of Barak due to [PR05] is constant-round, publiccoin, computationally special-sound and zero-knowledge (thus also witness hiding under sequential composition).
We would like to argue that in the context of security reductions, Turing reductions provide a semantically stronger (and more meaningful) notion of security than non-blackbox reductions, and are thus interesting to study in their own right. The existence of a Turing reduction from some problem P to the task of breaking a crypto system implies that any "physical device" with a reproducible behavior that breaks our crypto system, can be used-with only a polynomial slow-down-to solve P . With a non-black-box reduction, we can only solve P if we have an explicit description of the code of the attack on the crypto system. Such descriptions might be hard to find in practice: Consider, for instance, a "human-aided" computation, where a human is interacting with a computer program in order to break the crypto system; 9 getting an explicit description of the attack requires providing an explicit (and "short") description of our brain.
If the reader does not find the above "philosophical" argument compelling, we note that, to date, non-black reductions have only been successfully used to analyze interactive protocols that are impractical (e.g., they rely on PCPs). Furthermore, such techniques have only been successful in analyzing computationally-sound protocols (i.e., arguments); in contrast, many of the protocols we are considering are proof systems (i.e., they are unconditionally sound). So, one conservative way to interpret our results is that "current techniques" cannot be used to prove security of, for instance, Schnorr's identification scheme.
Overview
We provide some preliminaries and standard definitions 8 We remark that the unique witness requirement can be slightly relaxed. For instance, it suffices to ensure that the special-soundness extractor always recovers a uniformly chosen witness if there are many witnesses. This suffices for emulating an oracle that picks a uniform witness. We have not pursued this avenue further. 9 Practical attacks on crypto-systems often are not fully automatized, but do indeed rely on such interactions; see e.g., [AAG + 00].
in Section 2; we provide some new definitions in Section 3, and present our main theorem in Section 4. We provide a brief proof overview in Section 5 and defer the proof of the main theorem to the full version. The full version also contains our lower bounds for identification schemes, our results about the selective decommitment problem, lower bounds for generalized versions of one-more inversion assumptions, and lower bounds for unique blind signatures.
PRELIMINARIES
Algorithms. We employ the following notation for algorithms.
Interactive Algorithms. We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing Machine [GMR89] (ITM for brevity) and a protocol. Given a pair of interactive algorithms (A, B), we let A(a), B(b) (x) denote the probability distribution over the outputs of B(b) after interacting with A(a) on the common input x.
Oracle algorithms. An oracle algorithm is a machine that gets oracle access to another machine. Given a probabilistic oracle algorithm M and a probabilistic algorithm A, we let M A (x) denote the probability distribution over the outputs of the oracle algorithm M on input x, when given oracle access to A.
We will also consider oracle algorithms that get access to deterministic interactive algorithms. Given a probabilistic oracle algorithm M , and a deterministic interactive algorithm A, we let M A (x) denote the probability distribution over the outputs of the algorithm M on input x, when given oracle access to the "next-messages" function of A (i.e., the function that on input the messages (m1, .., m l ) outputs the next messages sent by A on common input x and receiving the messages (m1, .., m l ); note that this is well defined since we only consider deterministic oracles.) Black-box reductions. We consider probabilistic polynomial time Turing reductions-i.e., black-box reductions. A black-box reduction thus refers to a probabilistic polynomialtime oracle algorithm. Roughly speaking, a black-box reduction for basing the security of a primitive A on the hardness of a primitive B, is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine R such that R O "breaks" B, whenever the oracle O "breaks" A. As mentioned, when considering interactive oracles, we restrict attention to deterministic oracles; in particular, this means that the reduction has the power to restart or "rewind" its oracle; black-box reductions in the context of interactive protocols often take advantage of this feature.
Witness Relations. We recall the definition of a witness relation for an N P language [Gol01] .
Definition 1 (Witness relation).
A witness relation for a language L ∈ N P is a binary relation RL that is polynomially bounded, polynomial time recognizable and characterizes L by L = {x : ∃w s.t. (x, w) ∈ RL}.
We say that w is a witness for the membership x ∈ L if (x, w) ∈ RL. We will also let RL(x) denote the set of witnesses for the membership x ∈ L, i.e., RL(x) = {w : (x, w) ∈ L}. If for each x ∈ L, there exists a single w ∈ RL(x), we say that RL is a unique witness relation.
We will be interested in probability ensembles over witness relations.
Definition 2 (Probability ensembles). Let RL be a witness relation. We call D = {Dn}n∈N an ensemble of distributions over RL if Dn is a probability distribution over RL ∩ ({0, 1} p(n) × {0, 1} * ) where p is a polynomial. We call D = {Dn}n∈N an ensemble of distributions over RL with auxiliary information if Dn is a probability distribution over RL ∩ ({0, 1} p(n) × {0, 1} * ) × {0, 1} * where p is a polynomial.
NEW DEFINITIONS

Computational Special-soundness
Recall that a three-round public-coin 10 interactive proof is said to be special-sound [CDS94] , if a valid witness to the statement x can be efficiently computed from any two accepting proof-transcripts of x which have the same first message but different second messages. For instance, Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff's Quadratic Residuosity protocol [GMR89] , and Blum's Hamiltonian Cycle (Blum-HC) protocol [Blu86] are both all special-sound. One standard relaxation of special-soundness only requires that a witness for x can be extracted from m(|x|) accepting proof transcripts with the same first message but different second messages, where m(·) is a polynomial. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson's Graph 3-Coloring (GMW-G3C) [GMW91] protocol is an example of such a proof system. Two other relaxations are possible. We may consider protocols with more than three rounds. Furthermore, we may consider protocols that only satisfy a computational notion of special-soundness; that is, we only require that extraction is successful if the transcripts are generated in an interaction with a computationally-bounded prover.
Roughly speaking, we say that a k-round protocol is m(·)-computationally special sound, if the k − 1'th round is a verifier round and with overwhelming probability a witness to x can be extracted from any m(|x|) accepting proof transcripts that have been obtained by communicating with a computationally bounded prover, where the first k − 2'th messages are all the same, but the k − 1'st messages are all different. We note that, for instance, GMW-G3C and Blum-HC, instantiated with statistically-hiding commitments, satisfy this notion of special-soundness. We refer to the k − 1'th message as the verifier challenge.
Definition 3 (Computational Special-soundness).
Let (P, V ) be a k-round (where k is a constant) public-coin interactive argument for the language L ∈ N P with witness relation RL. (P, V ) is said to be computationally specialsound if there exists a polynomial m(·), and a polynomialtime extractor machine X, such that for every polynomialtime machine P * , and every polynomial p(·), there exists a negligible function µ such that the following holds for every x ∈ L and every auxiliary input z for P * . Let T = (T1, T2, . . . T p(|x| ) denote transcripts in p(|x|) random executions between P * (x, z) and V (x) where V uses the same randomness for the first k − 2 rounds (thus, the first k − 2 rounds are the same in all transcripts). Then, the probability (over the randomness used to generate T ) that:
1. T contains a set of m(|x|) accepting transcripts with different round k − 1 messages; and 2. X( T ) does not output a witness w ∈ RL(x), where T consist of the first m(|x|) accepting transcripts with different round k − 1 messages, is smaller than µ(|x|).
We say that a computationally special-sound protocol has a large challenge space if the length of the verifier challenge is ω(log n) on common inputs of length n.
Note that if a protocol is computationally special-sound with a large challenge space, there is a canonical "extraction" procedure from a prover P * : Honestly emulate the role of V for P * ; if the proof is accepting, rewind P * sending it new uniformly chosen verifier challenges until we get m(|x|) accepting proof transcripts; finally apply the specialsoundness extractor X on these transcripts-except with negligible probability, all of the accepting proofs have different verifier challenges and extraction thus succeeds.
Remark 1. A slightly more general notion of computational special-soundness: We note that for our proof it suffices to consider a standard generalization of public-coin protocols. It suffices that the verifier's next message function is a function of the current partial transcript and some fresh random coins: that is, in round i the verifier picks a random string ri, and computes its next message as a function of the public transcript and ri (but not as a function of any of the earlier coin tosses rj, j < i). The knowledge extractor, on the other hand, gets access to not only the public transcript, but also all the random strings r1, r3, . . . r k−1 ; that is, the knowledge extractor X now takes as input a sequence of verifier views V . We refer to such protocols as generalized computationally special-sound. For such a generalized notion of computational special-soundness, the notion of "large challenge space" requires that the length of the randomness r k−1 used in the verifier challenge is ω(log n).
Intractability Assumptions
Following Naor [Nao03] (see also [DOP05, HH09, RV10]), we model an intractability assumption as an interaction (or game) between a probabilistic machine C-called the challengerand an attacker A. Both parties get as input 1 n where n is the security parameter. The only requirement is that this interaction has an a priori bounded polynomial number of rounds; that is, there exists some polynomial r(·) such that C on input 1 n communicates with A in at most r(n) rounds and finally outputs either 1 or 0. Any such challenger C, together with a threshold function t(·) intuitively corresponds the assumption:
For every polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a negligible function µ such that for all n ∈ N , the probability that C outputs 1 after interacting with A is bounded by t(n) + µ(n).
We say that A breaks C w.r.t t with probability p on common input 1 n if Pr [ A, C (1 n ) = 1] ≥ t(n) + p. Note that we can easily model all traditional cryptographic assumptions as a challenger C and a threshold t. For instance, the assumption that a particular function f is (strongly) one-way corresponds to the threshold t(n) = 0 and the 2-round challenger C that on input 1 n pick a random input x of length n, sends f (x) to the attacker, and finally outputs 1 iff the attacker returns an inverse to f (x). Decisional assumptions (such as, e.g., the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, or the assumption that a particular function g is a pseudorandom generator) can also easily be modelled as 2-round challengers but now we have the threshold t(n) = 1/2. Also note that the assumption that a protocol (P, V ) is witness hiding for a particular instance distribution can be modeled as a polynomial-round challenger C and the threshold t(n) = 0: Simply let C be the machine that samples an instance x according to the distribution and next runs the prover algorithm and finally accepts if A outputs a witness for x. In fact, in the same way we can model the assumption that (P, V ) is witness hiding under a priori bounded sequential composition. This explains why for our results we need to restrict to C having a bounded number of rounds; otherwise, we could simply consider the assumption that (P, V ) is witness hiding under unbounded sequential composition.
Related Definitions of Cryptographic Intractability Assumptions. As mentioned, the work of Naor [Nao03] is seminal in formalizing cryptographic assumptions as games. His notion of a falsifiable assumption considers 2-round challengers; furthermore, he restricts to polynomial-time challengers. Although this suffices for modeling most natural cryptographic assumptions, we also want to be able to capture assumptions of the kind "it is hard to invert f on two random points, even if we get one arbitrary inversion query"; to model this as a game requires having C perform the inversion, which in general may require super-polynomial time.
The formalization of a falsifiable assumption from Gentry and Wichs [GW11] extends Naor's notion to multi-round challengers. Our notion of polynomial-round intractability assumptions is incomparable to the notion used in [GW11]: we require a fixed (i.e., independent of the running-time of the attcker) polynomial upper-bound on the number of communication round by C, whereas [GW11] allow C to communicate in an arbitrary polynomial number of rounds; on the other hand, we allow C to be unbounded, whereas [GW11] restrict C to be polynomial-time (in the length of the messages received from the attacker). For instance, the assumption that GMW-G3C is sequentialy witness hiding can trivially be modeled as a multi-round falsifiable assumption, so our lower bounds do not extend to these types of assumptions.
Our modeling of a polynomial-round intractability assumption is also similar to Dodis, Oliveira and Pietrazk's [DOP05] notion of a hard game. It differs in the following aspects: First, as [DOP05] consider only fully-black-box constructions, their notion of hard games are defined relative to some oracles. Secondly, just as in [Nao03] , they restrict to polynomial-time challengers,
The notion of a cryptographic game from Haitner and Holenstein [HH09] is even more similar; it is more general in that it considers unbounded challengers C that can comunicate with the attacker in an unbounded number of rounds (whereas we restrict to only a polynomial number of rounds), but is less general in that it only considers threshold t(n) = 0.
Finally, the notion of a cryptographic primitive from Rothblum and Vadhan [RV10] is even more general: it considers challengers (which they refer to as testers) that are given oracle access to (instead of simply communicating with) the alleged attacker.
THE MAIN THEOREM
We want to formalize the statement that there cannot exists a reduction from breaking any standard assumption C to "blatantly" breaking witness hiding of a computationally special-sound protocol-namely, always recovering the witness to the statement x after seeing polynomially many sequential proofs of x, no matter what distribution the instances come from. Let us start by formalizing what it means to break witness hiding in this strong way.
Definition 4 (Strongly Breaking WH). Let (P, V ) be an argument for the language L with witness relation RL. We say that A strongly breaks (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) with respect to RL if for every n ∈ N , every x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n , w ∈ RL(x), A wins in the following experiment with probability 1: Let A(x) sequentially communicate with P (x, w), (n) times; A is said to win if it outputs a witness w such that w ∈ RL(x).
We say that a protocol (P, V ) is weakly (·)-sequentially witness hiding w.r.t RL if no polynomial-time algorithm A strongly breaks (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL. Let us now turn to defining what it means to base weak witness hiding on the hardness of a standard assumption C.
Definition 5 (Basing Weak WH on C). We say that R is a black-box reduction for basing weak (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C w.r.t threshold t(·) if R is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine, such that for every deterministic machine A that strongly breaks (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) with respect to RL, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many n ∈ N , R A breaks C w.r.t t with probability 1 p(n) on input 1 n .
We are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 2. Let (P, V ) be a (generalized) computa-tionallyspecial-sound argument with large challenge space for the language L with a unique witness relation RL, and let C be an r(·)-round assumption, where r is a polynomial. If for every polynomial (·) there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C w.r.t threshold t, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine B and a polynomial p (·) such that for infinitely many n ∈ N , B breaks C w.r.t t with probability
That is, if RL is a unique witness relation, and (P, V ) is computationally special-sound with large challenge space, then if we can base weak sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C, then C can already be broken in polynomial time.
Remark 2. (A quantitative version) As becomes evident in the proof, we, in fact, prove the following quantitative version of Theorem 2: there does not exist a reduction from breaking any r(·)-round assumption C that cannot already be broken in polynomial-time, to strongly breaking (·)-sequentialwitness hiding, where (n) = ω(n + 2r(n) + 1).
Remark 3. (On the length of the verifier challenge) Note that the restriction on the length of the verifier challenge in (P, V ) is necessary: There exist zero-knowledge protocols that are (computationally) special-sound with verifier challenges of length O(log n) based on one-way functions: simply consider a parallelized version of the protocol of Blum [Blu86] .
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Remark 4. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) As becomes evident in the proof, the theorem extends also to superpolynomial-time reductions R with running-time T as long as the computational special-soundness of (P, V ) holds with respect to T = T O(log n T ) time adversaries, and as long as the length of the verifier challenge is ω(log T ). Both restrictions are necessary for this result: (1) As noted in [CGGM00, Pas03] , if we repeat Blum-HC log 2 n times in parallel, we get a special-sound proof that is zero-knowledge with a quasi-polynomial-time simulator; this, in particular, means that the protocol is sequentially witness hiding (even for unique witness relations) for all distributions that are "hard for quasi-polynomial time", and this can be proven using a super-polynomial time black-box reduction. But this protocol has a "short" verifier challenge. (2) Additionally, [Pas03] shows (assuming the existence of one-way permutations), the existence of a four-round computationally specialsound argument that is zero-knowledge with a quasi-polynomialtime simulator and has an n-bit long verifier challenge; the protocol, however, is only sound for poly-nomial-time algorithms.
PROOF OVERVIEW
Let (P, V ) be a k-round computationally-special-sound argument with large challenge space for the language L with a unique witness relation RL, let C be an r(·)-round assumption, and let t(·) be a threshold function. Let (n) = ω(n + r(n) + 1). Assume that there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C. That is, for every A that strongly breaks (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) w.r.t RL, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many n ∈ N , R A breaks C w.r.t t on common input 1 n with probability
. We show the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time machine B that directly breaks C without the help of A; that is, there exists a polynomial p (·) such that for infinitely many n ∈ N , B breaks C w.r.t t on common input 1 n with probability
The machine B will use the reduction R as a black-box, and emulate a particular oracle A for R. Let us start by fixing some notation: Let m = m(n) denote the number of accepting transcripts required by the computation specialsoundness property of (P, V ) on inputs of length n; let r = r(n) denote the number of communication rounds by C on input 1 n ; let M = M (n) denote the maximum number of queries to its oracle by R on input 1 n ; let = (n) = ω(n + r + 1) denote the number of sequential repetitions used for strongly breaking witness hiding of (P, V ). Towards the construction of B, we also make two (standard) simplifying assumptions about R: (1) R never asks the same query twice to its oracle; (2) Whenever R sends a query q to its oracle, it has previously queried the oracle on all partial transcripts in q. Both of these assumptions are without loss of generality; we can always modify R, at the cost of only a polynomial blow-up in running-time, to satisfy these two conditions.
Let f be a function, and let A f be a machine defined as follows. A f , on input 1 n , acts as the honest verifier V in sequential interactions with a prover for (P, V ), but with the exception that instead of generating truly random messages (as V would have done), A f computes its next message by applying f to the current partial transcript (and appropriately truncating the output of f to be of the right length); finally, after the (n) interactions, if all proofs are accepting, A f uses brute-force to extract a witness (if one exists) and outputs it (and ⊥ if no witness exists). We next consider a random oracle: Let RO be a random variable uniformly distributed over functions {0, 1} * → {0, 1} ∞ . By definition we have that for each n, with probability 1 over the choice of RO, A RO strongly breaks (·)-sequential witness hiding of (P, V ) with respect to RL.
13 Thus, by the fact that R is a good reduction, we have that there exists some polynomial p(·) such that
Remark 5. Before continuing, let us briefly explain the reasons for using the random oracle RO. There are two quite different reasons for this. First, it will allow us to "rewind" R while guaranteeing that R does not "notice" that it is being rewound. (Assume instead that we had let A use the honest verifier strategy V . This strategy sends the same verifier challenge no matter what (k − 2)-round message R sends it. Since R might rewind its oracle, it might thus send two different (k − 2) round messages for which it expects to hear back the same verifier challenge from A. In such a situation it becomes hard to "rewind" R feeding it new verifier challenges.) Secondly (and similarly to [GK96, Pas06] ), this will ensure us that R cannot "cheat" in the proofs it provides to its oracle by rewinding it.
Roughly speaking, on input 1 n , the goal of the machine B will be to run R while efficiently emulating the role of A RO . As previously mentioned, this will be possible by appropriately rewinding R to extract witnesses w for statements x proved by R to its oracle. More precisely, B will attempt to "rewind" the "verifier-challenge" (i.e., the k − 1'st message) in some of the proofs. We refer to the pair of a verifierchallenge, and the prover answer (i.e., the k − 1'st, and the k'th messages) as a slot. We say that a slot "opens" when R receives a verifier challenge from its oracle, and that the same slot slot "closes", when R sends its oracle the answer to the verifier challenge. Note that by our simplifying assumptions on R, a slot can never close without opening. However, also note that R might send a lot of other queries to its oracle between the time when a slot opens and closes. So, 13 We here rely on the fact that (P, V ) has perfect completeness, otherwise, we could only claim that A RO breaks sequential witness hiding with overwhelming probability for a random RO.
when attempting to rewind a slot, we need to be careful not to "redo" too much work. Formally, the opening of a slot is a partial view v of R immediately after which the slot opens; we may now identify a slot s by the view corresponding to its opening. Analogously, the closing of a slot s is a partial view v immediately after which s closes.
Let us turn to providing a high-level description of B. On a high-level, B internally incorporates R, internally emulates A RO for R, but externally sends all communication between R and C (i.e., whenever R wants to send a message to C, B externally forwards it, and whenever B receives an external message from C, it directly forwards it to R as if it came from its external interaction with C). R emulates A RO for R by following exactly the same instruction as A RO until a slot s "closes" and the following two properties hold:
• Between the time when the slot s opened, and the time that it closed, R did not send (and thus not receive) any external messages (to or from C).
• Between the time when the slot s opened, and the time that it closed, the number of other slots that opened is "small", where "small" will be defined shortly.
Whenever such a slot s closes, B rewinds R back until the point where s opened, and instead sends R a new random verifier challenge (by our simplifying assumption that R never asks its oracle the same query twice, this can never create any inconsistencies), and continues the emulation of A RO as before, but with the exception that if R opens too many new slots, the rewinding is cancelled. B continues rewinding R until it gets m accepting closings of slot s; intuitively, this should allow B to use the special-soundness extractor to recover a witness for the statement proved. We remark that in contrast to the simulation technique of [RK99], we do not decide what slot to rewind based on the number of executions that start within the slot, but rather, following [CLP10] , decide what slot to rewind, based on the number of slots within the slot. More precisely, the emulation is defined recursively in the following manner. Given the view τ of R (w.l.o.g., this includes all the messages sent and received by R in the external interaction with C, and all the messages sent and received between R and its oracle), we call a prefix ρ of τ d-good if 1) R makes no external queries in τ after ρ, and 2) the number of slots that open in τ after ρ is at most M n d (recall that M is a (polynomial) upper bound on the number of oracle queries made by R). Given a partial view τ after which we have the closing of a slot s, we say that the slot is d-good in τ if s is a d-good prefix of τ . Now, on recursive level d ≥ 0, starting from a view V, B emulates A RO for R, until a slot s that opened inside the view V closes and the slot is d + 1-good for the current view v; whenever this happens, it rewinds R back to the point when s opened, and invokes itself recursively at level d + 1. It continues rewinding until it gets m accepting closings of slot s, and then applies the special soundness extractor X on these m transcripts; if the extractor outputs a valid witness w (to the statement x currently proved by R), the pair (x, w) is stored. Furthermore, at each recursive level d ≥ 1 (i.e., on all recursive levels except the first one), if V is not a d-good prefix of the current view v (i.e., if the number of new openings of slots exceeds M n d , or if R wants to send an external message) the recursive procedure aborts (returning to the earlier recursive call); this ensures that all rewindings are "cut-off" if R attempts to send external messages, or opens more slots, in the rewinding. Finally, whenever R is expecting to hear back a witness w for a statement x from A RO , B checks whether such a witness w has been extracted; if so, it simply feeds it to R, and otherwise B halts outputting fail.
In the full version we show that B runs in expected polynomial time, and furthermore that B can obtain m accepting proof transcripts of x where the first k − 2 messages are the same, but (with high probability) the k − 1'st messages are all different, before it has to provide R with a witness for x. Thus, intuitively, by computational special-soundness of (P, V ), B can run the special-soundness extractor on these accepting transcript and get a valid witness. The problem is that computational special-soundness only requires extraction to work when the first k − 2 messages have been generated in an interaction with a "standard" (non-rewinding) polynomial-time prover, but in our context they have been generated in a conversation with R (acting as a prover), and R has the possibility of rewinding its oracle. We rely on the fact that (P, V ) is public-coin (or that the verifier's next message function only depends on the public transcription) and only has a constant number of rounds (and techniques similar to Goldreich-Krawzyk [GK96] and their use in [Pas06] ) to show that despite the fact that R is rewinding its oracle, it can still not generate a transcript for which special-soundness extraction fails.
